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INTEREST OF THE AMICI 1
The Commercial Law League of America (the "CLLA"), founded
in 1895, is the nation's oldest organization of attorneys and other ex-
perts in credit and finance. Its membership exceeds 3,900 individu-
als actively engaged in the fields of commercial law, bankruptcy and
reorganizations. The 1,200 bankruptcy lawyers and bankruptcy judges
of the Bankruptcy Section of the CLLA represent virtually every
state, both small and large practices, and divergent interests and par-
ties. The CLLA has testified on numerous occasions before Congress
as experts in the bankruptcy and reorganization fields.
The CLLA appears as amicus to provide a practical, experienced
perspective to complement and reinforce the scholarship and argu-
ments of the Respondent and the other amici supporting the
Respondent.
The CLLA has long represented and advocated creditor interests,
but its members recognize that the fair, equitable, uniform and effi-
cient administration of bankruptcy cases and debtor-creditor relations
requires that all parties, including the States, participate in the bank-
ruptcy process. Had the States retained sovereign immunity from the
discharge of indebtedness (or from other generally applicable bank-
ruptcy court powers) that would have perpetuated the very disunity,
disorder and uncertainty which the Framers and the People con-
fronted and rectified when they granted Congress the power to enact
"uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies."
The appearance as amicus of a predominantly creditor-oriented or-
ganization to advocate universal discharge of debts is not paradoxical
or incongruous. It is empirical and logical. Creditors recognize that
the bankruptcy system best serves all interests when the availability of
a discharge from debts provides the incentive for the debtor to dedi-
cate her assets for equitable, economical, expeditious distribution
among creditors.
As the brief of the State of Ohio (hereinafter, the "States' Brief")
acknowledges, the States frequently have debts or other interests to
be addressed in bankruptcy cases. The CLLA - and creditors gener-
1. Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Amicus
files this brief with the written consent of both parties, which are appended hereto. No counsel
for a party authored this brief in whole or in part. No person or entity including Amicus or its
counsel made a monetary contribution for the preparation or submission of this brief; it has been
prepared pro bono. Michael S. Schreiber, a professor of law at Cardozo Law School and a
member of the New York Bar contributed to the preparation of this brief. Louis S. Robin of the
Massachusetts Bar and Peter C. Califano of the California Bar, officers of the CLLA, also
assisted in the preparation of this brief.
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ally - have learned from experience that the implications of State sov-
ereign immunity reach far beyond discharge determinations, to
include, for example, the automatic stay (11 U.S.C. §362), the turn-
over of assets (11 U.S.C. §544), the determination of tax liability (11
U.S.C. §505) and certain special tax provisions in chapter 11 cases (11
U.S.C. §1146(c)).
Although these particular powers under modern bankruptcy law
may not have been expressly considered by the Framers, they re-
present necessary and appropriate expressions of Congress's power to
pass "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies." "In using that
phraseology, the founders of the Nation could not define or foresee
the limits of its future application, but in all their work, they clearly
understood that 'they were not building a strait-jacket to restrain the
growth and shackle the spirits of their descendants for all time to
come."' Charles Warren, Bankruptcy in the United States at 4
(Harvard University Press 1935) [hereinafter "Warren"].
The decision in Hood v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp., 319
F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2003) advances the salutary goals of a uniform
bankruptcy system. Reversal would undermine both the Constitu-
tional structure and modern bankruptcy law and process.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The thought which we will develop is that when insolvency comes
the debtor's affairs should be liquidated for the benefit of his credi-
tors on the basis of equality. As a corollary, the debtor (if he aids
toward that end) ought to be discharged from further liability on the
debts to which, on a basis of equality, he has now dedicated his
assets.
Garrard Glenn, The Law Governing Liquidation (Baker Voorhis &
Company 1935) [hereinafter "Glenn"] at 4. The "reality" is "that
debtors and creditors are partners in debt, and never more so than
when debtors are insolvent." Bruce H. Mann, Republic of Debtors:
Bankruptcy in the Age of American Independence (Harvard U. Press
2002) [hereinafter "Mann"] at 45.
"[T]hose who are interested in the American system must give En-
glish origins the place of first importance." Glenn at 291. At the start
of the Eighteenth Century, English law first recognized what common
sense and practical experience taught: creditors recover more assets,
faster and with less cost, when the motivation for debtors to deliver
their assets for distribution to creditors arises not only from compul-
sion but also from reward.
[Vol. 2:185
TENN. STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORP. v. HOOD
The same common sense and practical experience applied in the
Colonies and States, of course, but their differing bankruptcy and in-
solvency schemes necessarily frustrated and prevented the separate,
but mutually-reinforcing, goals of debtors and creditors. The Framers
understood the problem. Their remediation included the "surrender
of [sovereign] immunity in the plan of the convention" when the Con-
stitution empowered Congress to enact uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 717 (1999), citing The
Federalist No. 81 (Hamilton).
Sovereign immunity from the bankruptcy discharge (and the bank-
ruptcy process generally) is ahistorical, is not dictated by this Court's
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence and, most importantly, is in der-
ogation of the language, purpose and structure of and the Constitution
and the understandings of the Founding Fathers.
In passing upon the grave constitutional question presented in this
case, we must never forget, as Chief Justice Marshall admonished,
that the Constitution is 'intended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs,'
and that '(i)ts means are adequate to its ends.' Cases do arise
presenting questions which could not have been foreseen by the
Framers. In such cases, the Constitution has been treated as a living
document adaptable to new situations. But we are not called upon
today to expand the Constitution to meet a new situation. For, in this
case, we need only look to history and time-honored principles of
constitutional law-principles that have been applied consistently by
all branches of the Government throughout our history. It is those
who assert the invalidity of [section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code]
who seek to amend the Constitution in this case.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 479, 682-83 (1952)
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
The symbiotic relationship between debtors and creditors requires
that all creditors - including the States - be involuntary participants in
the bankruptcy process and the discharge of debts. The Framers un-
derstood this; the Constitution authorizes it.
Petitioners and their amici misread the relevant history, misstate
the problems attendant to State sovereign immunity and misapply this
Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. For the reasons set forth
below, and as demonstrated in the brief of Respondent and the briefs
of the other amici in support of Respondent, the judgment below
should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
Point I: The Surrender of Sovereign Immunity Is Inherent In the
Plan of the Convention
History, language and logic provide "compelling evidence' that the
States were required to surrender their sovereign immunity to Con-
gress "pursuant to the constitutional design" with respect to bankrupt-
cies. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781 (1991).
Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code simply acknowledges and memo-
rializes what the "plan of the convention" did two hundred years
earlier.
A. History
When the Constitution was enacted, debtors and creditors con-
fronted differing State laws, rights and remedies. Some States had
laws modeled on English bankruptcy law; New York, for one, had a
law that afforded a debtor a discharge from debts on consent of three-
quarters of the creditors; other States had provisions for discharge of
the debtor from prison, but not for discharge of the debtor's debts.
Warren at 6-7. "The only consistency among debt laws in the eight-
eenth century was that every colony, and later every state, permitted
imprisonment for debt." Mann at 79.
The hodgepodge of laws and their uneven enforcement offered
debtors no assurance that the protections afforded by the bankruptcy
law of one state would be enforced in another state: "a state cannot by
such a law discharge one of its own citizens from his contracts with
citizens of other states, though made after the passage of the law, un-
less they voluntarily became parties to the proceedings in insolvency."
Brown v. Smart, 145 U.S. 454, 457 (1892). Debtors with multi-state
relationships and debts had little incentive to give up their assets for
the benefit of local creditors when doing so afforded them no protec-
tion from creditors in other States.
The disparate laws and multiple jurisdictions also adversely affected
creditors. The Colonies began to recognize that the property of an
insolvent belonged to all creditors, not simply the quickest (Mann at
47-48), but the realization of that ideal was difficult. The absence of a
discharge binding upon all creditors meant that creditors could offer
little to entice debtors to file bankruptcy. Hon. Randall J. Haines, The
Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different, 77 Am.Bank.L.J.
129, 155 (2003) [hereinafter "Haines"]. "Only a uniform federal law
with a discharge (1) binding across state lines ... and (2) effective
against states whose laws, courts and sheriffs refused to acknowledge
[Vol. 2:185
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foreign state discharges could end the stalemate and permit all credi-
tors to offer a sufficient collective incentive for the debtor to disclose
and turn over all his assets." Id. at 155-56.
The Framers' response to these problems was two-fold. First, of
course, was to grant Congress the power to enact "uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcies." Second, was the early bankruptcy legis-
lation enacted under that power.
Congress turned to bankruptcy legislation in the first session of the
1st Congress and returned to the subject of bankruptcy in each of the
next four Congresses. Warren at 10. The first bankruptcy law, en-
acted in 1800, was essentially the same as the legislation introduced in
each of the earlier Congresses. Id. The template for the Bankruptcy
Act of 1800 was the existing English bankruptcy law. Charles Jordan
Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3
American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review at 7; Warren at 13-14.
Three aspects of the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 provide compelling
evidence that the States did not retain - and were understood at the
time as having not retained - sovereign immunity over the subject of
bankruptcies.
First, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 was enacted only three years after
the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment and only seven years after
Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793) - the decision that "shocked"
the nation into enacting that amendment. College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S.
666, 669 (1999). It is illogical - if not extraordinary - to assume that
the Congress in 1800 disregarded or ignored the recent reaffirmation
of the States' sovereignty immunity. Yet, the 1800 Act expressly made
the debts of the States immune from discharge. Bankruptcy Act of
1800, §62. The amici States Brief notes this provision, but misses its
import. That statutory grant of immunity was superfluous if the States
had retained sovereign immunity in bankruptcy.
Second, the 1800 Act contained uniform exemptions for debtors.
Id., §34. Nothing in the Act suggests an individual debtor could not
enforce those exemptions against the States or recover exempt prop-
erty in the possession of the State. Congress must have understood
that that would be the result and that debtors would be without a
remedy if the States - as they argue today - enjoyed sovereign
immunity.
Third, the 1800 Act expressly authorized federal courts to issue
writs of habeas corpus to free debtors from state prisons. Id., §38.
Judge Haines has noted that this provision uniquely conferred federal
jurisdiction over the States and their conduct (and his analysis need
2003]
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not be repeated here). Haines at 174-81. The inclusion of the writ of
habeas corpus - without recorded dissent or concern - in the 1800
Act demonstrates compellingly that the Framers understood that the
power to enact "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies" was in-
tended to invade the usual prerogatives and protections of State
sovereignty.
"[E]arly congressional enactments provide contemporaneous and
weighty evidence of the Constitution's meaning." Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (Scalia, J.) (internal alteration and
quotation marks omitted). The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 (which was
essentially the same as legislation introduced in the first four Con-
gresses) provides "contemporaneous and weighty evidence" that the
plan of the convention surrendered the sovereign immunity of the
States "on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States."
B. Language
Three facts about the bankruptcy clause appear unarguable. First,
there is little recorded discussion of bankruptcy during the convention
or in the subsequent advocacy in favor of or against the ratification of
the Constitution. See Amicus Brief of the Council of State Govern-
ments, Etc. at 10 [hereinafter "Council Brief"]. Second, the subject of
bankruptcy apparently first arose at the Convention during debate
over the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See Railway Labor Executives
Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 471-72 (1982); See Warren at 4-5.
Third, the bankruptcy power was discussed and understood in relation
to the federal power to regulate interstate and international com-
merce as expressed in the commerce clause. See Council Brief at 11;
See Warren at 7.
That relative silence compels examination of the text of the bank-
ruptcy clause, including a comparison of that text with the text of
other powers in Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution.
That examination itself raises three questions. If the bankruptcy
clause is no more than an adjunct to the commerce power, why is it
separately enunciated? If the reference to a "uniform" law is a limita-
tion on the power of Congress, and not a grant of affirmative power,
why was the language not placed at the end of the commerce clause,
like the requirement at the end of the first clause of Section 8 ("but all
duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States")? If the subject of bankruptcies first arose during the discus-
sion of Full Faith and Credit, why does the provision appear as a grant
of power in Article I rather than as an obligation of the States under
Article IV?
[Vol. 2:185
TENN. STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORP. V. HOOD
The placement and wording may be unintentional. However,
"[w]hen two parts of a provision [of the Constitution] use different
language to address the same or similar subject matter, a difference in
meaning is assumed." Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 978 n.9
(1991) (internal citation omitted). Cf. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S.
19, 31 (2001) (It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a
statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be
prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant. It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause
and word of a statute) (internal alteration and quotation marks
omitted).
The better answer - and the one that is consistent with both the
foregoing rules of statutory construction and the evidence of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1800 - is that the distinct wording and separate
placement were necessary to distinguish the clause and the surrender
of sovereign immunity which it effected from other Article I powers.
C. Logic
The Framers understood and appreciated the practicalities and the
effects of what they did. There is nothing in their contemporaneous
expressions or actions that implies that the Framers intended other
than to remedy the existing problems on the subject of bankruptcies.
Logical inference also provides compelling evidence of the States' sur-
render of sovereign immunity.
The bankruptcy clause was intended to remedy the problem of one
State not enforcing the discharge (or other law) of another State. As
a consequence, creditors could be immune from the effects of bank-
ruptcy unless they voluntarily participated. The States' retention of
sovereign immunity would render the power to enact uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcies only a partial and ineffectual remedy, leav-
ing the debts of States immune "unless they voluntarily become par-
ties to the proceedings."
The bankruptcy clause of the Constitution was intended to remedy
the problem that equality of distribution among creditors would not
be achieved if one creditor could stand aside and other creditors were
forced to race for the assets. The States' retention of sovereign immu-
nity would render the power to enact uniform laws on the subject of
bankruptcies only a partial and ineffectual remedy, leaving States as
preferred creditors "unless they voluntarily become parties to the
proceedings."
The differences among the States with respect to the treatment of
debtors and creditors inhibited commerce among the States. At a
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minimum, merchants and other creditors had to consider the uncer-
tainty and difficulty of enforcement and collection in making their
business decisions (just as creditors today would have to consider the
risk that States would opt-out of bankruptcy cases). Uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcies were intended to remedy these problems.
The States' retention of sovereign immunity would render the power
to enact uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies only a partial and
ineffectual remedy, allowing the States to determine from bankruptcy
case to bankruptcy case whether or not "they voluntarily become par-
ties to the proceedings."
None of history, text or logic suggests that the bankruptcy clause
was intended to be an incomplete or weak remedy to the problems on
the subject of bankruptcies confronting the Nation. On the contrary,
history, text and logic all provide compelling evidence that the bank-
ruptcy clause was intended to be effective and pervasive, and that the
waiver of State sovereign immunity was an intended and necessary
component in the achievement of that result.
Point II: Affirmance Adheres to this Court's Recent Eleventh
Amendment Jurisprudence
The Eleventh Amendment - - and the sovereign immunity that the
Amendment reaffirms (See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1997)) -
protect the States from private suits. Congress cannot use its Article I
powers to authorize private suits against the States to enforce federal
law absent consent by the State or consent in the "plan of the conven-
tion." Blatchford at 784.
The compelling historical and textual evidence of consent in the
plan of the convention is set forth in Point I, supra. There is, however,
another respect in which the issue now before the Court differs mate-
rially from the issues addressed in the Court's recent Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence. This difference derives from the "subject
of bankruptcies," the essence of the debtor-creditor relationship and
the means by which bankruptcy law has been and is now enforced.
This difference provides further evidence that the States were re-
quired to surrender their sovereign immunity with respect to the sub-
ject of bankruptcies "pursuant to the constitutional design." Alden at
731.
The Court's recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence involves
the purported exercise of Congressional power under Article I of the
Constitution to authorize private suits (e.g., Alden) by a "particular
person" (Blatchford at 785) or "individual interests" (Ex parte Ayers,
123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887) against a State. The Court has invalidated
[Vol. 2:185
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Congressional efforts to permit private suits by Indian tribes (Semi-
nole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); private suits under
the ADEA (Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)); pri-
vate actions before the Federal Maritime Commission (Federal Mari-
time Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743
(2002)); private actions under the ADA (Board of Trustees of the
Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)); private suits under
the FLSA (Alden); private suits under the Trademark Remedy Act
(College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999)); and, private action under the Lan-
ham Act (Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Bd. v.
College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)).
Such private suits unconstitutionally invade the sovereign immunity
of the States as derived "from the structure of the original Constitu-
tion itself. Alden at 728. It was not within the contemplation of the
Framers and not inherent in the plan of the convention that individual
suits would be a means, let alone the means, of enforcing federal law.
See Federal Maritime Commission.
However, bankruptcy law at the time of the Constitutional conven-
tion and today was and is fundamentally different. In bankruptcy, pri-
vate suit is the means of enforcing federal law. It would be unusual, if
not extraordinary, for the federal government to bring suit to enforce
the rights of an individual debtor or an individual creditor, even
though the rights or duties of either are defined by federal law.2
Bankruptcy has been defined by the Court as the "subject of the
relations between an insolvent or nonpaying or fraudulent debtor and
his creditors, extending to his or their relief" that "includes the power
to discharge debts." Railway Labor at 466 (citation omitted). The
"core" of bankruptcy is the restructuring of debtor-creditor relation-
ships. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co v. Marathon Pipe Line Co, 458
U.S. 50, 71 (1982). The discharge is "at the core of federal bankruptcy
power." Id.
English law, Colonial law and State law were no different. The indi-
vidual, not the government, enforced the rights and remedies of the
debtor. The Framers must have understood that the power transferred
2. The impractability, if not impossibility, of federal enforcement of the bankruptcy law
should be obvious from the fact that more than 1.5 million bankruptcy cases were filed in 2003.
The States' Brief (at 1) observes that over 440,000 bankruptcy cases were filed in the second
quarter of this year and objects that "a State [may be forced] to defend its rights at a time and
place solely of the debtor's choosing." Were federal enforcement to be the norm, the States
would confront the same litigations and same forum, but the federal government would bear the
added time and expense of the litigations now spread among the 50 States.
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to the federal government to enact "laws on the subject of bankrupt-
cies" would follow historical precedent and authorize private suits.
Federal government enforcement would have been "anomalous," not
a considered option. Where the States were creditors or otherwise
involved with debtors, they could only have anticipated that private,
not governmental, suit would be the rule. This was true, for example,
with respect to habeas corpus under the Bankruptcy Act of 1800. See
id., §38.
Bankruptcy thus provides the converse of the situation that has pre-
viously come to this Court. Bankruptcy presents the question whether
the federal government must enforce rights that are almost always pri-
vate, not whether Congress can authorize private parties to enforce
rights that are public and can be enforced by the federal government.
Outside of bankruptcy, private suits to enforce federal law may be
"anomalous" (Federal Maritime Commission) but such suits are nor-
mal, if not necessary, to enforce the rights inter se of debtors and
creditors.
In sum, the "subject of bankruptcies" presumes private enforce-
ment of rights. The Framers contemplated private suits, not federal
governmental enforcement. If the States had retained sovereign im-
munity with respect to "laws on the subject of bankruptcies," then
they would have effectively immunized themselves from the reach of
federal bankruptcy law, would have left debtors with no remedy for
the rights conferred under federal law and effectively eviscerated the
power to enact "uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies" and the
Supremacy Clause with respect to bankruptcy law. Such perverse re-
sults can not have been and should not be inferred as the "plan of the
convention."
Point III: The Waiver of Sovereign Immunity With Respect to
Discharge of Debt Does Not Offend the Dignity of
the States
Sovereign immunity preserves the "dignity" that the States retained
after the Constitution was enacted. Unlike Federal Maritime Commis-
sion or Alden, this case does not involve a private cause of action
against the State which Congress has created and authorized as an
alternative to direct federal enforcement. This case illustrates well
why suits against the States in bankruptcy do not constitute unconsti-
tutional offense to State dignity. The debtor merely seeks to establish
that she owes nothing to the State, not that the State owes anything to
her. The dignity of the State is left unblemished.
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In truth, Congress created a private need to sue the States, not a
right to sue, with respect to student loan discharge. See 11 U.S.C.
§523(a)(8). The dignity of the States in the federal system is less of-
fended where Congress requires a private citizen to sue before ob-
taining relief from the State than where - as in the situations that have
heretofore come to this Court - Congress grants a private right to sue
the States.
Debt discharge is inoffensive to State dignity in other material re-
spects. There are no damages or invasion of the State treasury. The
debtor seeks only to eliminate or avoid an obligation or debt, not to
recover anything. That is particularly true in this case, where the rela-
tionship to the State arises from a voluntary act of the State in becom-
ing a lender or creditor. In a real sense, the State has chosen and
determined its relation to the debtor. Unlike those situations which
have been found offensive to State dignity, the individual has not cho-
sen to impose or enforce a relation or duty upon the State. The State
may not have "consented" to be sued, but it certainly has chosen a
relationship with an individual with knowledge that the relationship
could be adjusted or discharged in the bankruptcy court.
The minimal (if any) affront to the States is further demonstrated
by the ease with which the requirement of suit against the State can be
undone. The present statute denies a discharge of student debt "un-
less" the debtor proves financial hardship. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(8). The
statute places the burden of persuasion on the debtor. However, the
identical result could be obtained without suit against the State by
amending existing law to provide that the debtor obtains a discharge
of her student loan unless the State objects. The burden of coming
forward might change, but the burden of persuasion could be left as it
is: upon objection, the debtor would have the burden of proving
hardship.3
A similar result is unobtainable with respect to non-bankruptcy fed-
eral law. Congress cannot grant damages or a presumptive remedy to
every private litigant who might be aggrieved by the State's non-com-
pliance with federal law - unless the State objects. In bankruptcy, in a
real sense, the private suit is unnecessary. In the non-bankruptcy con-
text - as in the statutes previously before the Court - the private suit
is the only means of obtaining relief. The distinction between the
3. This is essentially the practice for certain other debts that are declared non-dischargeable,
but nevertheless become dischargeable if the affected creditor does not object. 11 U.S.C.
§523(c)(1). A practical equivalent also exists under the present system for claims allowance.
Claims are presumptively valid unless a party objects. Upon objection, the claimant has the
burden of proof, however. See Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001(f) and 3007.
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more flexible and adjustable bankruptcy process and the non-bank-
ruptcy process means that the former is less offensive to the dignity of
the States than the latter.
The proceeding to discharge a debt is particularly inoffensive to
State dignity. The uniform enforceability of the discharge and the re-
lease from debtors' prison were two of the underlying problems that
induced the constitutional requirement of uniform bankruptcy laws.
The dignity of the States at the time of the Constitution must be
viewed in the context of the States' being subject to suits to release
debtors from prison. To the extent that a debtor's discharge today
could be viewed as affecting State dignity, that effect is demonstrably
less offensive than the suits that could have been and were brought
against the States at or before the time of the Constitution.
Debt discharge is inoffensive to State dignity in other material re-
spects. The relationship between the individual as debtor and the
State as creditor inherently intrudes less upon the State than in the
non-bankruptcy context when an individual brings suit against the
State. There is no invasion of the State treasury. The debtor seeks
only to eliminate or avoid an obligation or debt, not to recover any-
thing. That is particularly true in this case, where the relationship to
the State arises from a voluntary act of the State in becoming a lender
or creditor. The State, as creditor, is "an entity that has a claim
against the debtor." 11 U.S.C. §101(10)(A). By contrast, where the
State is sued, the private party pursues her claim against the State.
In a real sense, the State has chosen and determined its relation to
the debtor. Unlike the situation which is offensive, the individual has
not chosen to impose or enforce a relation or duty upon the State.
The State may not have "consented" to be sued, but it certainly has
undertaken and chosen a relationship with an individual with knowl-
edge that the relationship could be adjusted or discharged in the bank-
ruptcy court.
Discharge acts prospectively to bar the State and its officers from
collecting a debt in violation of federal law, it does not authorize an
individual to sue the State to redress past violations of federal law
(like the statutes that been invalidated heretofore). The State as cred-
itor is not hailed into court to defend itself from a claim or obligation
created by Congress. Congress determines how and whether the obli-
gation can be enforced against the individual, but Congress does not
create or establish the obligation, let alone authorize private suit to
enforce the obligation.
This is not to ignore the current statutory scheme or the substantive
effects that derive from the current scheme. However, Congress un-
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questionably has the power under the bankruptcy clause - should it
choose to exercise that power - to eliminate or discharge fully and
unconditionally a debtor's obligations or debts to the State. By choos-
ing not to exercise the greater power, but rather to establish a proce-
dure and a standard as a predicate to the unqualified relief that could
be imposed Constitutionally, Congress has actually conferred or ac-
corded greater dignity to the States than they would otherwise have
and more than the Eleventh amendment and sovereign immunity re-
quire. Rather than a categorical command prohibiting State enforce-
ment of a debt owed to the State, Congress has granted the State the
right and opportunity to prove or establish that enforcement should
not be prohibited under particular circumstances. It strains the mean-
ing of the word to hold that the States' "dignity" is offended by an
opportunity to avoid a result when, as here, the imposition of the re-
sult is Constitutional and not offensive.
The CLLA would be remiss in its obligation as amicus if it did not
apprise the Court of other representative circumstances where State
sovereign immunity - were it to exist - would have substantial impact
on the bankruptcy system.
First among these circumstances is a provision that allows the equal-
ity of distribution that bankruptcy expects. That provision, of course,
is the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C. §362. As enacted, the automatic stay
applies to the States (as entities under the Bankruptcy Code). How-
ever, the present statutory scheme would allow the States to violate or
ignore the scheme with apparent impunity.
The express remedy for violation of the automatic stay is damages:
"An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by
this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attor-
neys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances may recover punitive
damages." 11 U.S.C. §362 (h). The remedy is, by its terms, available
only to an individual, not a governmental entity. However, sovereign
immunity would bar a suit to recover damages against the State. Stay
violations are generally void, but sovereign immunity would bar an
action to recover an asset seized or other acts in violation of the stay.
Even if the federal government could intercede to pursue such a plain
violation of federal law, that intervention might not allow compensa-
tion to the party aggrieved and would probably be too late to provide
effective redress.
A second problem arises if the States retain sovereign immunity.
The Bankruptcy Code makes the trustee the "representative of the
estate" and gives the trustee the "capacity to sue and be sued." 11
U.S.C. §323. However, the trustee could not sue the States without
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their consent - neither in the bankruptcy court (as the statutory
scheme intends) nor in state court. See Alden. This denies the trustee
(and the estate the trustee represents) access to the "avoiding pow-
ers," including the power to recover fraudulent conveyances or pref-
erences. See 11 U.S.C. §542 through 549. As a result, certain of the
fundamental protections for equality of distribution would become
unavailable against the States.
One need not be "[ ]willing to assume the States will refuse to
honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United States"
(Alden at 755) to conclude that the inability of the trustee to sue
would render the avoidance powers useless against the States. First, it
strains credulity (if not budgetary concerns) to assume that the federal
government would pursue fraudulent conveyances or preferences on
behalf of individual estates. Second, preferences and fraudulent con-
veyances are often not obvious. There are elements of proof and de-
fenses. Even a State aware of its obligations and intending to fulfill
them might conclude in good faith that the retention of an asset or the
avoidance of an obligation was did not violate the Constitution or "the
binding laws of the United States." Third, pursuing a voidable trans-
action becomes questionable when it is necessary to rely upon the
"good faith of the States . . . as an important assurance" (Id.) that
there will be a recovery to justify the cost and time of the exercise.
Fourth, and most practically, proving a fraudulent conveyance or pref-
erence may require discovery from the transferee. Without the ability
to sue, there is limited ability to obtain the requisite discovery.
The final illustration involves various remedies that are available in
reorganization cases, but which would not be available against the
States if they have sovereign immunity. These remedies include (but
are certainly not limited to) the sale of property free and clear of liens
(11 U.S.C. §1123(a)(5)(D)); the satisfaction or modification of a lien
(11 U.S.C. §1123(a)(5)(E)); the curing or waiving of any default (11
U.S.C. §1123(a)(5)(G)); and prohibitions on the collection or enforce-
ment of certain taxes 11 U.S.C. §1146(c)).
It is self-evident that the "plan of the convention" - were the con-
vention to be held today - would include the surrender of State sover-
eign immunity as a component in the construction of any "uniform
law on the subject of bankruptcies." It should equally be self-evident
that the "plan of the convention" that took place two and quarter cen-
turies ago when the Framers drafted the Constitution also included
the surrender of State sovereign immunity.
[Vol. 2:185
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Conclusion
The Bankruptcy Code does not offend State sovereignity. The
States transferred their immunity from suit with respect to the "sub-
ject of bankruptcies" within the plan of the convention. Reversal of
the decision below would undermine the uniform bankruptcy system
and return "the subject of bankruptcies" to the vagaries, disunity and
uncertainties that existed at the time the of enactment of the Constitu-
tion and that the Framers sought to remedy by the bankruptcy clause.
For the reasons set forth above and in the briefs of the Respondent
and the amici supporting the Respondent, the decision below should
be affirmed.

